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ABSTRACT  
   
Many wildlife species that are essential to human livelihoods are targeted with the aim of 
extracting short-term benefits. Overexploitation, resulting from failed common-pool 
resource governance, has endangered the sustainability of large animal species, in 
particular. Rights-based approaches to wildlife conservation offer a possible path 
forward. In a wildlife market, property rights, or shares of an animal population, are 
allocated to resource users with interests in either harvest or preservation. Here, I apply 
the Social-Ecological Systems (SES) framework (Ostrom, 2009) to identify the 
conditions under which the ecological, social, and economic outcomes of a conservation 
market are improved compared to the status quo. I first consider three case studies 
(Bighorn sheep, white rhino, and Atlantic Bluefin tuna) all of which employ different 
market mechanisms. Based on the SES framework and these case studies, I then evaluate 
whether markets are a feasible management option for other socially and ecologically 
significant species, such as whales (and similar highly migratory species), and whether 
market instruments are capable of accommodating non-consumptive environmental 
values in natural resource decision making. My results suggest that spatial and temporal 
distribution, ethical and cultural relevance, and institutional histories compatible with 
commodification of wildlife are key SES subsystem variables. Successful conservation 
markets for cross-boundary marine species, such as whales, sea turtles, and sharks, will 
require intergovernmental agreements. 
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Over the past two centuries, species extinctions escalated to 1,000 times background rates, and 
large animal species are now among the most threatened (MEA, 2003; Schipper et al., 2008). 
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment identified harvest of wildlife as a significant threat to 
biodiversity (Groombridge and Jenkins, 2002). Many of these overexploited species are common 
pool resources (CPRs), which, in the absence of an effective regulatory regime, are vulnerable to 
the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968). CPRs are shared goods in a resource system with 
properties that make it difficult to exclude access. Use of CPRs is substractable, meaning when a 
portion is consumed, less is available to others (Anderies and Janssen, 2013). Collective action 
measures around CPRs often hinge upon convergence of local land users, hunters, local 
government and the international community, all of whom have different interests in the 
resource, its welfare, and repercussions of consumption (Dietz, 2003). Institutional gridlock may 
occur when the species is deemed both a resource and a nuisance by different parties (Horan, 
2004; Bulte et al., 2008). Moreover, CPRs that are migratory species, traversing territories and 
possibly crossing multiple jurisdictions, are particularly problematic precisely because of the 
difficulty of establishing an effective regulatory regime (Allen, 2010; Cerveny, 2013).   
 
In this paper, I ask whether markets can be used to (a) ensure sustainable use of CPRs involving 
multiple jurisdictions and (b) engage stakeholders with non-consumptive interests in wildlife 
stocks in wildlife harvest decisions. By employing the Social-Ecological Systems (SES) 
framework (Ostrom, 2009) to bring an interdisciplinary perspective to the wildlife markets issue, 
I evaluate the plurality of benefits derived from wildlife and develop a comprehensive 
understanding of the associated value tradeoffs with a market for animal harvest rights. 
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Markets for wildlife are a historic part of human society. The formal buying and selling of hide, 
meat, bone, and more recently tourist excursions have taken place for animals under well-defined 
property rights (Perrings, 2014). Markets of this form have proven to be an effective agent for 
conferring economic value to natural resources, although environmental markets are far fewer 
for wildlife that raise technical and ethical challenges not faced by nonliving resources, like 
pollution and water (Rademaekers et al., 2011). In fact, markets for cultural ecosystem services, 
like aesthetic, bequest, and option value (considered as non-consumptive resource values) have 
failed to emerge (Perrings, 2014). Well-functioning, competitive markets signal to users an 
approximate level of abundance or scarcity of a resource and give some indication of its 
importance. Markets embrace the relationships between people and the environment and seek to 
sustain these flows of goods and energy. Perhaps because of this broad appeal, such solutions are 
gaining momentum within the public (e.g., the United States Department of Agriculture) and 
private sectors (e.g., Goldman Sachs and Forest Trends). Granted, economic-based mechanisms 
are not a panacea to social-ecological dilemmas, but there are settings and species for which they 
are appropriate. In light of the increased interest in markets to support conservation efforts 
alongside other management strategies, with this research I explore the conditions under which 
wildlife conservation markets are possible. 
 
Wildlife conservation markets offer an approach to achieve conservation goals given limited 
financial resources (Costello et al., 2012; Minteer and Gerber, 2013; Gerber et al., 2014
A, B
). 
Recently, Costello et al. (2012) proposed a conservation market for cetaceans in which 
stakeholders could buy and sell the rights to preserve or harvest whales. My use of the term 
‘wildlife market’ in this discussion is distinct from economic or more common understandings of 
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a market as a rigorous economic-based mechanism. Firstly, it is a derivation of environmental 
markets. Secondly, the way I use it here is consistent with a burgeoning concept within the 
conservation community and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In this context, a wildlife 
market is a more inclusive application of the phrase referring to the exchange of rights to ‘use’ 
animals, whether that be consumptive, such as farming for meat, or non-consumptive, such as 
photo-tourism. In broader terms, a market is a platform for buyers to purchase property rights to 
a desired good, and property rights are constrained rights to use a resource (Demsetz, 1967). 
Actions are said to be constrained because there are socially accepted ways for which property 
owners can exercise their right. Many institutions for single- and multi-use natural resources 
alike have adopted property rights arrangements to control harvest, notably forestry, fisheries, 
and water issues. The question is how can wildlife markets do what other conservation strategies 
have not, that is allocate resources efficiently to enable the expression of legitimate conservation 
interests independent of harvest in decision making.   
 
To dissolve mounting social pressure, the Costello et al. proposal would have the IWC allocate 
secure and tradable rights to the resource among users via a ‘whale market’ system. A similar 
system, termed ‘catch shares’, has already applied to the management of fisheries worldwide, 
and catch shares have been defended as leading to sustainable outcomes when combined with an 
effective mechanism to monitor the use of the harvest rights (Fischer, 2010; Biggs et al. 2013; 
Kinzig et al., 2011; Pinkerton, 1989). With the peril of collapse looming over large, mismanaged 
fisheries, catch shares have helped overexploited fish populations recover by enhancing the 
quota, or total allowable catch (TAC) (Wilder, 1995; Tietenberg, 2006; Arnason, 2012; Grafton, 
2006; Costello, 2008). The assignment of property rights has circumstantially shown to have 
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ecological and economic benefits above management alternatives for CPRs (Costello, 2008). 
Contracting of rights is one of the most difficult steps in this policy process, necessitating fair 
negotiation and distribution (Libecap, 1993). Insofar as these criteria are met, property rights 
stand to be instrumental to sustainable management as more natural resources are confronted 
with overexploitation and poorly established institutional arrangements (Hilborn et al., 2005). 
There have been skeptical responses to this proposal especially in regards to the market 
efficiency (Smith et al., 2014) and moral acceptability of commodifying whales, which will be 
addressed in detail later. 
 
Since 1946, the International Whaling Commission (IWC) has overseen the intergovernmental 
agreement on whale management. It began as strictly a fishing enterprise with the primary 
responsibility of setting catch quotas but lacked codified ecological or ethical obligations 
(Gambell, 1993). The intention was for stewardship practices set by the Commission to guide 
and complement whaling activity at the national level while also safeguarding stocks and 
defending against indirect threats to whales. Over time, the autonomy entrusted to member 
nations by the IWC failed to translate into sustainable domestic policies and thus led to 
overfishing, despite the Commission’s admonition (MMC, 1973; Caron, 1995). In light of 
depleting stocks, the IWC’s Scientific Committee, appointed in 1961, adopted rigorous science-
based stipulations for safe harvesting rates of different whale populations (Gambell, 1993). For 
all intents and purposes, this was uncontested until the emergence of the United States (US) 
environmental movement in the 1960s, which prompted moral inquiry into the industry and the 
practice of culling whales, while simultaneously instigating political tensions between whaling 
and non-whaling nations (Scheiber, 1998; Caron, 1995). Later, as a case study, I explore why the 
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gradual disintegration of the whaling industry seen since the ban on commercial harvest in 1986 
calls for a market to regulate harvest. 
 
I first describe the creation of institutions and the conditions that give rise to market regimes in 
general and how they are applied to the environmental context. From there, I explain how multi-
use interests in species are collapsed into natural resource management schemes, motivating my 
literature review of nonuse values for wildlife. Together, these discourses inform and give 
context to the three case studies of existing wildlife markets that I qualitatively analyze. In these 
cases, I draw on the SES characteristics that determine the success of a market mechanism to 
achieve conservation goals and synthesize these variables to recommend whether such markets 





                                                 
1
 There are, of course, other important questions to ask about the broader application of wildlife markets, including 
issues of market efficiency and welfare, the determination of a valid, aggregate price for wildlife, and setting of total 
allowable harvest levels. These questions, however, are beyond the scope of the present analysis. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ECONOMICS, INSTITUTIONS AND THE EMERGENCE OF MARKETS 
Because competition is a cost to society, institutions arise when cooperation shows more promise 
to enhance welfare or attain higher standards than independent action (Young, 1997). 
Governance mechanisms, denoted by Young (1994, p. ix), are “social institutions or sets of rules 
guiding the behavior of those engaged in identifiable social practices.” Markets that contract 
property rights, a particular kind of institution, according to Harold Demsetz (1967), are created 
when joint net benefits exceed the costs of privatization. In other words, “property rights develop 
to internalize externalities when the gains of internalization become larger than the cost of 
internalization” (Demsetz, 1967, p. 176).  
 
Property rights are chosen to settle what Demsetz calls ‘scarcity problems’ (1964) and may 
emerge as a result of recognized finite abundance of a shared resource. This knowledge, if 
accounted for in the market, drives price changes. Resource values hold constant if stakeholder’s 
interests are protected against strategies producing short-term gains at the expense of long-term 
outlooks. When values in the resource are higher in the future than they are today, rights holders 
have an incentive to delay exploitation (Alchian and Demsetz, 1973). Future biodiversity loss, 
for example, might be reduced if the prices of today’s species reflected their role in securing 
lasting, healthy ecosystems in addition to their role in the provision of foods, fuels and fibers. 
(Fujita, 2012; Assessment, 2003). 
 
Shifts in economic values resulting from technological innovation (e.g., genetically modified 
organisms that boost economic efficiency) or changes in preferences (e.g., demand for ‘luxury' 
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protein sources, such as beef) may also affect the relative prices of goods and prompt 
reevaluation of the status quo. Property rights buffer immediate, consumer responses to these 
changes to avoid overexploitation. In instances where the value of a commodity rises, property 
rights thwart the inclination to harvest in excess and exhaust the resource supply. Gary Libecap 
(1993, p. 1) claimed that, “property rights are the social institutions that define or delimit the 
range of privileges granted to individuals to specific assets.” When unconstrained, however, 
markets can fail and result in poor effects equivalent to that of no property rights (Fujita, 2012). 
Rights holders will evade the rules in the absence of lawful or social regulation. Hence, policies 
can achieve higher rates of compliance and better environmental and social outcomes by 
ensuring that benefits feedback to the actors who directly internalize costs and are capable of 
exercising good stewardship (Alchian and Demsetz, 1973).  
 
Paradoxically, wildlife species that are most taxing to manage often stir human sentiment and the 
desire to protect them. Large-bodied, long-lived species, which are typified ‘charismatic’ 
animals, are particularly susceptible to exploitation (Schipper et al., 2008). For example, rare 
African trophy animals are highly valuable in markets, but their vulnerability to this threat is 
compounded by other exogenous stressors (Johnson et al., 2010). This vulnerability to 
exploitation is magnified in the case of marine megafauna because they face multiple direct and 
indirect threats and a relative paucity of biological information is known about them (Schipper et 
al., 2008; Ressurreição et al., 2011). Marine resources are also open access goods, meaning they 
are rival and non-excludable. Open access is a situation in which there are no restrictions 
regarding use of a resource (Anderies and Janssen, 2013). Consumption of fish on the high seas, 
8 
for example, reduces the total amount available to other users, which compels fishermen to take 
what they need before the pool is depleted, leading to ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968). 
 
From an economic standpoint, being labeled ‘endangered’ has been shown to be a dominant 
influence on willingness-to-pay (WTP) for the protection of a species (Tisdell et al., 2007). In 
some cases, ethical attitudes toward the moral status of animals or species may lead individuals 
to assign a relatively high WTP and to favor a complete moratorium on harvest for megafauna. 
Spash (2000) used social literature to help explain the role of attitudes and ethical considerations 
in interpreting economic measures of environmental valuation, like WTP studies. He explains 
that WTP can be interpreted as a proxy for attitudes towards an environmental problem and 
should not be taken as a purchase of benefits. In other words, a stated payment is a charitable 
contribution and does not reflect (or is not affected by) scope and details of the provision in 
question, as an economist might expect (Spash, 2000). Stated behavior based on ethics can also 
lead to the refusal to make ethical and economic tradeoffs for non-human nature. At the same 
time, management founded in the recovery of imperiled species has a relatively low return on 
investment and currently garners inadequate conservation funds (Clark, 1973
A,B
), thus making 
extinction the most economically efficient option in the short term (Clark, 1973
 A
; Martin-Lopez 
et al., 2008; Martin-Lopez et al., 2009). In the Western world, there is an evident bias towards 
the protection of charismatic species, yet there is also popular support for broader objectives of 
biodiversity conservation (Ressurreição et al., 2011).  
 
A rich history of natural resource economics informs and draws on the variety of ways property 
rights sustain environmental goods. Wildlife markets seek to involve stakeholders with non-
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consumptive interests in a stock alongside those intending to harvest. Traditionally the latter has 
constituted the majority of market participants. Fisheries management is an illustration of this 
point. This single-use management focus is due to the fact that markets historically have not been 
designed to accommodate non-consumptive values and only recently has this preservationist 
position been allowed to compete directly with extractive users within a single market. When 
this happens, a key question emerges:  How can it be ensured that both legitimate interests are 
recognized in decision making?  
 
To do this, it is important to consider lessons from CPR management that have succeeded by 
allocating the use of rights to resources with multiple uses. Forest access rights are one of the 
earliest forms of markets for natural resources. In fact, much of the ‘commons’ literature centers 
on the development of cooperative forest use (Ostrom, 1990). Both the species that are targeted 
and forestry practices themselves, whether to clear-cut or selectively harvest for example, are 
widely discussed (Clark, 2010). Through time, styles of forest management have differentiated in 
tune with human interests. What was once just a business with social and technological 
implications gained an understanding of uses beyond utility (Davis and Johnson, 1987), as 
forests provide a plethora of benefits to humans everywhere, including carbon sequestration, 
flood mitigation, habitat for species diversity, fuel, fertilizer, and building material (Kaimowitz, 
2002; Calder, 2002).  
 
Similarly, coral reefs are an example of a multi-species, multi-use natural resource. Coral reefs 
foster many fish communities and invertebrates that rely on coral for habitat or food. These 
incredibly diverse ecosystems adsorb dissolved carbon and provide coastal protection (Mumby 
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and Steneck, 2008), but are threatened by disease, climate change (e.g., bleaching from warm 
waters (Christie and White, 2007)) and human land use decisions that cause eutrophication 
(Mumby and Steneck, 2008; Hughes et al., 2003). These harbors of sea life draw attention and 
revenue from tourists; yet, at the same time, tourism has negative impacts on coral reefs (e.g., 
physical damage by tourists and the catch of non-target fish species (Walters and Samways, 
2001)). To balance the interest of conservation and sustainable use, one growing strategy has 
been to abut marine protected areas to swaths of reef for tourists (Agardy, 1993). Marine 
protected areas are an SES that can be beneficial to fisheries, biodiversity, habitat restoration and 
tourism (e.g., Loreto Bay National Park in the Gulf of California). 
 
Though complex issues, both of these examples pertain to sessile resources that have a clear 
advantage in spatial organization. Non-mobile resources can be partitioned off into zones to 
easily restrict access with robust enforcement. Forest and coral reef management are 
accompanied by countless other markets for multi-use species where there are parties that derive 
benefit from exploiting the stock and others that attribute greater value to the stock persisting.  
Multi-use planning demands the balancing of these goals to avoid ecological damage and to 
appease stakeholders. Yet this raises the question: why do people derive benefit from the stock of 




NON-CONSUMPTIVE VALUES OF WILDLIFE 
An extensive volume of research is devoted to measuring and describing attitudes toward non-
human species using socio-psychological and economic techniques to capture the best possible 
comprehensive valuation. The scope is broad. It includes, but is not limited to, aesthetic 
preferences, consumption practices, historical perspectives, and acquired knowledge in effort to 
determine people’s WTP for the non-consumptive enjoyment of different attributes of wild, 
living species. Wildlife valuation is at the crux of the resource units and resource users à la 
Ostrom’s SES literature. Though insightful to a degree, the phrasing and contexts of questions 
engenders some level of non-comparability across contingent valuation studies (Nunes and van 
den Bergh, 2001). This type of information is relevant to wildlife markets because settling on a 
conservation strategy involves many actors all with different mental models that shape their 
policy preferences; and collectively, this can lead to more effective, sustainable management.  
 
Available data suggest that ‘charisma’ strongly dictates human valuation of non-human species 
(Lorimer, 2007). Albeit a human projection, charisma stems from a number of biological indices 
exhibited by a species, including morphology, locomotion, detectability of sound, visibility, and 
communication methods, among others. These attributes garner public attention and capture 
human emotion for a variety of evolutionary, social, cultural, and historical reasons. ‘Human 
extensionism’ refers to preferences for a suite of phenotypes that grant child-like qualities to a 
species (Kellert, 1983; Kellert, 1985
A-C
; Kellert, 1993; Kellert and Westervelt, 1983). For 
example, possessing anthropogenic features, such as a large head and an upright posture, 
stimulates the human sense of connectedness (Gonzalez-Suarez et al., 2012; Lorimer, 2007). In 
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direct contrast, species found in clusters, with exaggerated features, irregular proportions, non-
responsiveness to humans, and parasitic lifestyles induce negative human attitudes. Beyond  the 
physical and life-history attributes, social aspects of a species also contribute to charismatic 
designations, which are formed through human interactions in a variety of settings, ranging from 
childhood encounters to scholarly work (Lorimer, 2007). High perceivable intelligence is also an 
attractive species quality (Metrick and Weitzman, 1996).  
 
Such perceptions of wildlife are related to nonuse values, which are the benefits derived from 
wildlife that do not depend upon consuming any part of an animal now or in the future. Whether 
people intend to see whales or other species and places, nonuse values underlie the desire to 
preserve them. Indeed there are noneconomic benefits to natural resources that are categorized 
into existence value, aesthetic value, bequest value, option value, and altruistic value (Freeman, 
2003). Nonuse values, according to stated preference surveys, amount monetarily to substantial 
sums that may be of interest to policymakers.  
 
Czech et al. (2001) found that survey respondents demonstrated a disproportionate affiliation for 
mammals, birds, and fish over reptiles, amphibians, microorganisms, and invertebrates.  
Mammals and birds not only appeared on more magazine covers than other taxa, they were the 
focus of more scientific research, dominated new Endangered Species Act (ESA) listings, and 
received the most conservation dollars (Clucas et al., 2008; Martín-López et al., 2009; Metrick 
and Weitzman, 1996). From 1989-1999, 10 species out of 554 were given over half of ESA 
funding (Doremus, 1997). Fictional species with names that sounded like familiar charismatic 
creatures drew a greater WTP than their reptilian or invertebrate counterparts (Karaffa et al., 
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2012). Most striking about these finding is that the basis of concern is primarily a subjective 
conception of the species over a factually informed view. Nonetheless, WTP for threatened 
species has increased since two decades ago, and an endangered status itself evokes concern in 
people (Richardson and Loomis, 2009; Wallmo and Lew, 2012; Campbell and Smith, 2006), and 
depending on socio-economic factors, participants of a study in Donana, Spain were WTP for 
non-charismatic species, too (Martin-Lopez et al., 2007). For these reasons, we can anticipate 
investment in conservation to grow. In fact, industries fueling conservation activity for whales 
and other marine megafauna, like whale watching and conservation volunteer programs, are 
already vigorous. The vital role ecotourism now plays worldwide, particularly in developing 
countries, motivates biodiversity protection. 
 
Just as species have aesthetic, spiritual, religious, totemic, and inspirational value, they harbor 
scientific and educational values as well. Private WTP for species conservation follows the same 
patterns in public funding decisions, meaning species features, such as charismatic attributes, 
impact science and policy agendas. For instance, intrinsic species features are correlated to 
volume of data, which is because some species are easier to study and more suitable for 
experimentation (e.g., small, quickly reproducing species) (Gonzalez-Suarez, 2013). Intrinsic 
species features, at times, override scientific justification for government spending on 
endangered species. Emphasis in terms of policy, science, and public visibility has tended to 
focus on terrestrial systems without sufficient attention devoted to the value of marine 
environments (Turner et al., 2003). Ultimately, this could be detrimental to conservation goals 
(Mills, 2012).  
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To illustrate this point, consider the Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973. When deciding on 
species listings and approaches to take, the ESA precludes cost-benefit analyses that would 
normally imply how to rationally act. Instead, the ESA favors the use of the best available 
scientific data to inform legislation. Each state has a scientific authority that provides impact 
assessments of species recovery plans and mines species data that is evaluated against listing 
criteria (Doremus, 1997). Kareiva and Marvier state that, “conservationists increasingly use data-
based decision science to identify which actions in which places will yield the greatest impacts 
under the constraint of limited resources” (2012, p. 961). Moreover, the economic implications 
of policy decisions are increasingly more important in determining the strategy that best balances 
social and ecological tradeoffs. Future studies and policies should widen their analysis to 
different taxa and understudied regions (Ressurreição, 2011). Otherwise, with these blinders, 
policy runs the risk of deleterious biases and the disintegration of ecosystem-level perspectives. 
 
Status quo conservation agendas have a narrow focus on flagship and high-profile species, 
hindering the advancement of scientific knowledge at the species and ecosystem levels. We are 
less able to calculate an accurate value for biological goods about which relatively little is 
known. Holistically speaking, we lack a comprehensive understanding of biology’s true worth 
(Ehrenfeld, 1988). An example of this is bioprospecting, which is “the search among the genetic 
codes contained in living organisms for the development of chemical compounds of commercial 
value in agricultural, industrial, or pharmaceutical applications” (Nunes and van den Bergh, 
2001, p. 210). Intrinsic and moral values are also important facets to wildlife valuation, though 
they are notoriously difficult to describe in the form of a figure or value that translates well 
across disciplines, like ethics and economics.  
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The attribution of intrinsic value (IV) to nonhuman species and ecosystems reflects a non-
anthropocentric view of nature that, when used constructively, can complement the instrumental 
valuation of biological resources. The concept of IV refers to entities that have value in-and-of 
themselves, that is, value independent of human interests. Another way of stating this is that 
moral consideration must be extended to entities said to possess IV (Callicot, 1984). There are, 
however, different theories of IV. On the “weaker” account, people assign intrinsic value to 
nature (i.e., the value is anthropogenically sourced). IV is, in this case, simply one of the many 
values people can and do ascribe to nature (i.e., they can value nature for its own sake, or more 
anthropocentrically, that is, for its direct and indirect usefulness). A “stronger” theory of IV, 
however, holds that moral worth is something that nonhuman entities and/or systems have 
independent of any human valuation (Soulé, 1985).  
 
Much debate has taken place in the philosophical and conservation literature over how intrinsic 
value enters into decision making (e.g., McCauley, 2006; Justus et al., 2009). For example, if the 
interests of two species (each of which is claimed to possess IV and thus be morally 
considerable) come into open conflict, which interest should win out? Despite the allure of IV 
arguments among conservationists, there is typically no prioritization framework offered that 
could produce a clear answer to such practical questions of moral judgment (Justus et al., 2009). 
Nor is there consensus regarding the holders of IV. Some philosophers (e.g. animal rights 
theorists and some biocentrists) argue that IV can be ascribed to individuals, while others 
(holistic biocentrists or ecocentrists) suggest that it can be attributed to whole systems. The 
apparently incommensurable nature of intrinsic and instrumental values and the ambiguity 
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surrounding the focal species or system possessing IV greatly complicates the appeal to IV in 
conservation decisions.  
 
This does not mean, however, that commitments to the intrinsic value of biodiversity have no 
place in conservation planning and practice. Minteer and Gerber (2013) consider the moral 
tradeoffs of using market tools to protect wildlife. They suggest that these ethical arguments are 
an imperative component to the conversation, as the embrace of intrinsic value leads to a broader 
conception of an entity’s value. These commitments also play an important role, they argue, in 
motivating the broader policy goal to conserve species and protect ecosystems and so are 
valuable for this purpose. Ethical reasoning, moreover, does not preclude economics from having 
a role in conservation efforts. One possible accommodation, then, is to consider IV-of-nature 
arguments as providing a moral foundation for the wider policy goal of wildlife conservation, 
with economic instruments (e.g., markets) serving as one set of alternative means to achieve this 







THE SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS FRAMEWORK 
To learn more about the efficiency of wildlife markets as programs to protect species through 
regulated access and whether markets, like a catch shares model, are an appropriate approach to 
conservation, I employed the SES framework. This analytical framework is useful for identifying 
differences across species, people, and governments. I use the framework to understand rather 
than eliminate system complexity in my case studies. 
 
The SES conceptual framework is a product of Elinor Ostrom’s seminal work on human-
environment relationships that extends Institutional Analysis and Development to studying 
governance in ecological systems (Ostrom, 2007). It emphasizes the interconnected nature of 
multiple sets of capital and clearly shows how flows of information or resources are a cyclical 
process, involving biophysical elements, actors, governance structures, interactions, and 
outcomes (Anderies and Janssen, 2013). Ostrom intended for the SES framework to be adaptable 
and scalable, and though it has been heavily cited for community self-organization cases, it is 
entirely applicable and useful for broader CPR dilemmas (Agrawal, 2002; Anderies and Janssen, 
2013). The value of this approach is that system components and relationships between them 
may be isolated to identify weaknesses in the system, to define SES connections with public 
policy, and to understand how this leads to policy change.  
 
Out of her cross-case comparisons, Ostrom deduced the SES subsystems and second-tier 
variables for governing environmental resources (Ostrom, 2009) (Figure 1). The four core 
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subsystems of the SES are the resource units, resource system, governance system, and users. 
Within those, the second-tier variables act as an introduction into the public policy process 
because this process is directly linked to the social and ecological contexts in which it is 
embedded (Figure 2). I use the SES subsystem variables to retain the complexity of my case 
studies, as Ostrom encourages, but also to distill them into their component parts in order to 
determine causes of success and challenges. For readability purposes, in my descriptions I 
collated features of the SES framework that are tightly intertwined into subsections, such as 
‘Users’ and ‘Resource Units and Resource System’. These variables inform my analysis of a 
potential whale conservation market. Several cetaceans are folded into one study because, 
although biologically diverse, whales are all managed under the purview of the IWC. Therefore, 
I chose to analyze the institution rather than separate populations.  
 
Beyond the novelty of wildlife conservation markets, application of the SES framework is an 
important contribution to the field of wildlife management. Markets are playing an increasing 
role in CPR management, and Ostrom’s coupled systems perspective is an appropriate one to 
adopt for evaluating their potential. Wildlife markets are examples of coupled SESs. At a 
scholarly level, Ostrom touted the SES as a means to merge disciplines, such as resource 
economics, policy studies, and sociology, which normally use different rhetoric and concepts 
(2007). The SES approach was most appropriate for this evaluation because wildlife markets are 
at the crux of multiple disciplines, making it challenging to select an analytical framework from 
any single one of those root disciplines. After an SES analysis, there is potential to go more in 
depth with the literature most pertinent to research findings from the initial analysis, and this was 
an attractive feature when selecting a framework. 
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Figure 2. Ostrom (2009) second-tier variables for analyzing social-ecological systems 
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CASE SELECTION 
I drew from a review of the literature cases of species conservation and management that 
employ, at least in part, a market mechanism. Here, I use the SES framework to examine the 
cases of 1) Bighorn sheep in the US, 2) South African white rhinos, and 3) Atlantic Bluefin tuna. 
Economic-based systems of wildlife management, in particular, operate throughout the world in 
diverse institutional and biophysical settings. Over time this literature has produced a dataset 
relevant to understanding when and which populations are amenable to such institutional 
arrangements. These data also give a sense of the conditions under which rights-based 
management can optimize social and ecological gains. A dialogue about the role of property 
rights reverberates throughout these cases, and best practices can be transferred between 
contexts. Additionally, each of the cases shares features with international whale management, 
which make them appropriate choices for informing the formation of a whale conservation 
market. 
 
Current wildlife markets function under a variety of social, biological, and institutional settings, 
so they cannot be compared directly without a few assumptions. Despite the distinct lineages, 
physical attributes, and human perceptions of each (Czech et al., 2001; Czech et al., 1998), the 
species share a common feature:  all have been threatened due to insufficient management 
practices or overharvesting. My criteria for choosing these three cases were also based on each 
being similar to whales on some level. Firstly, the policy history of Bighorn sheep runs parallel 
to that of whales. These animals were historically hunted by indigenous and later colonial people 
for products, such as their hide and meat. Then, when populations became critically low, hunting 
was halted. Since then, hunting Bighorn sheep has been reinstated even though some 
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subpopulations are considered endangered. The IWC has followed a similar path of regulation 
changes. Secondly, rhinos and whales both have high profile, iconic statuses that render them 
targets of the very public and principled ethics/ economics debate. Finally, Bluefin tuna are 
pelagic, endangered, and coveted for their meat. Catch shares are a well-known example of 
wildlife markets that a whale conservation market closely models, so it was a natural (and 
imperative) comparison to make in this analysis. 
 
Furthermore, the case of white rhino management in South Africa depicts the bigger situation of 
game management in South and East Africa. Similarly, with recreational hunting in North 
America, I use Bighorn sheep to illustrate how hunting performs as a conservation strategy for an 
at-risk species. To avoid losing site of the goal to diagnose the market, I intentionally narrowed 
to certain species and countries to allow for a more depth discussion. All of the cases are 
megafauna, but there is also diversity: Bighorn sheep fall within one jurisdiction, white rhinos 
may cross multiple without physical barriers, and Bluefin tuna occupy multiple jurisdictions as 
well as international waters. In addition, Bighorn sheep and Bluefin tuna are endangered while 
white rhinos are near threatened by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) 
criteria. 
 
CASE 1:  BIGHORN SHEEP IN THE UNITED STATES 
Users and Interactions. An integral part of the North American model of wildlife 
management is recreational hunting, which entails eliminating predators to regulate populations 
and ecosystem impacts. From the colonial era, parks and reserves were the main strategy for 
protecting nature, but this view later became inclusive of humans. The hunting tradition spawned 
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from recognition that human use of wildlife is inevitable, especially since recreation and socio-
cultural purposes displaced the subsistence aspect of hunting as the US modernized (Loveridge 
et al., 2007). In the late 19
th
 century, Theodore Roosevelt was a powerful figure in carving out 
the role of sport hunting of species, like Bighorn sheep (Ovis canadensis), Canadian geese 
(Branta canadensis), and black bear (Ursus americanus) in the country’s conservation efforts. In 
1887, Roosevelt and George Bird Grinnell, a writer of naturalism and anthropology, founded the 
Boone and Crocket Club (B & C Club), an organization that synergized the dual roles of hunter 
and conservationist. It also championed the creation of several national parks and landmark, 
science- and funding-related legislation for the protection of land and wildlife resources (e.g., 
Timberland Reserve Bill, National Wildlife Refuge System Act, Federal Duck Stamp Act). 
Around this time came the formation and development of federal land management agencies 
(e.g., US Fish and Wildlife Service (1940), US Forest Service (1905), the National Park Service 
(1916)) and wildlife conservation organizations (e.g., National Audubon Society (1905), 
National Wildlife Federation (1937), and Ducks Unlimited (1937)), which can be attributed, by 
no small measure, to the involvement of the B & C Club (Boone and Crockett Club, 2014). 
 
Among its numerous conservation achievements, the Club established a set of principles guiding 
the sustainable and ethical practice of hunting, one of which is fair chase. Fair chase outlaws the 
practice of ‘canned hunting,’ or shooting animals in small enclosures in which they have no 
chance of escaping the hunter (Lindsey, 2008). Today hunting associations, in order to remain 
legitimate, also foster positive relationships with scientists and NGOs, including the IUCN 
(Baldus et al., 2008). These partnerships facilitate the Club’s primary initiative today of 
maintaining a scoring and data collection system by which North American big game animals 
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may be objectively measured and tracked as a gauge of successful wildlife policies and 
management. Such records have been vital for assessing changes to populations over time. 
 
The legacy of Roosevelt and Grinnell was picked up later by foresters, game managers, and 
environmentalists, like Aldo Leopold. In his early work, Leopold was mostly concerned with 
boosting game availability, but his mature ecological and conservation interests rooted from a 
‘land ethic’ in the 1940s that would influence  modern conservation missions of many 
organizations in the ensuing decades. The Leopoldian ethic promotes wildlife and ecological 
protection, but it also recognizes the goal of sustainable use. In this sense, Leopold’s work 
represented a significant evolution from the narrower projects of resource managers, like Gifford 
Pinchot, who tended to prioritize more utilitarian motivations (Callicott, 1990). At the same time, 
the ‘sustainable use’ model remains a significant feature of contemporary conservation science 
and policy. The Convention on Biological Diversity, for example, defines sustainable use as “the 
use of components of biological diversity in a way and at a rate that does not lead to the long-
term decline of biological diversity, thereby maintaining its potential to meet the needs and 
aspirations of present and future generations” (UN, 1992). Decades after the groundwork was 
laid by early conservationists, the ethics of hunting remains an essential piece of the 
conversation.  Fundamentally, some people would never be able to take a life no matter the 
hunter’s objective and animal suffering. “The welfare of animals at an individual level often 
conflicts with conservation of the species at a population level,” and even non-killing 
interactions with animals can invoke stress (Loveridge et al., 2007, p. 225). Such moral 
commitments are accompanied by other intangible, non-consumptive values of hunted species. 
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At present, federal and state agencies, private landowners, individual recreationists, and park 
visitors comprise the direct users and managers of Bighorn sheep. The Desert Bighorn Council 
Transactions, a multi-disciplinary group formed to deliberate on the shortage of information on 
bighorns, started in 1957 and now produces an annual report (Monson and Allen, 1980). Then in 
1977, the Foundation for North American Wild Sheep became the primary wild sheep 
conservation organization in the world. These organizations hang in the balance of social and 
ecological objectives, embracing the notion that people cannot be removed from wildlife 
management.  Hunted species are often kept at levels deemed acceptable by the public and most 
profitable in terms of management costs and benefits (Kaltenborn et al., 2013; Schuhmann and 
Schwabe, 2000). Access permits allow scientists, citizens, and managers to engage in activities 
that balance use and species conservation. In 2011, 13.7 million people, 11.6 for big game, 
participated in hunting and/ or wildlife viewing (US Fish and Wildlife, 201). Understanding the 
consumptive and non-consumptive values helps determine how to go about attaining the optimal 
population size according to human preferences and needs.  
 
Resource Units and Resource System. Bighorn sheep are herbivorous ungulates that 
boast two heavy, curled horns. Bighorns congregate in herds of five to fifty that are scattered 
across the western US, Alberta and British Columbia, Canada, and northern Mexico. In the US, 
the population is subdivided into 10 subspecies, which can crudely be differentiated into desert 
and mountain Bighorn. Their ranges, principally on federal and protected land, do not overlap 
geographically and, therefore, do not intermingle (Festa-Bianchet, 2008). The entire population 
is listed as ‘of least concern’ by IUCN criteria while the Rocky Mountain subspecies was added 
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to the Endangered Species List in 1999. From 1999-2011, numbers went from just over 100 to 
about 400 (California Fish and Game, 2014). 
 
These separate populations have adapted behavioral idiosyncrasies in response to different 
environmental conditions, but they share common features as well. Though the population spans 
multiple jurisdictions, single herds are very philopatric, returning seasonally to the same 
location, and are unlikely to cross national borders. These animals are impressive aesthetically 
because of their physical stature and ecologically for their ability to scale rocky, steep terrain. 
Migrations of mountain Bighorn entail thousands of feet of elevation gain between winters at 
low elevation and summers in higher alpine areas (California Fish and Game, 2014). Bighorns 
can be found in 30 US national parks where they are used in non-consumptive practices, like 
tourism, guiding, and sport hunting, although poaching is also a threat. Hunting rates were once 
much higher, which contributed to the near exhaustion of the population (Monson and Allen, 
1980). Early 19th century, up to 2 million bighorn were estimated to live on the continent. 
Numbers fell with westward expansion of American hunters and the introduction of 
domesticated species that reduced forage (Monson and Allen, 1980). 
 
Today encroachment by human development, fragmentation, and reduced genetic diversity are 
the main anthropogenic threats that constrain population growth and disrupt migration patterns 
(Festa-Bianchet, 2008). Poor connectivity between habitats leads to rapid population decline and 
genetic diversity loss in this species (Jorgenson et al., 2007). Disease, throughout the late 20
th
 
century into today, has also been a major stressor on population viability, especially for herds in 
proximity to livestock (Gutierrez‐Espeleta et al., 2007). Moreover, Bighorn sheep develop 
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slowly and have low productivity. Females give birth to a single offspring per six-month 
pregnancy. Young sheep have variable survival rates but adult survival is high (California Fish 
and Game, 2014). Due to recovery programs implemented by 14 state agencies, involving efforts 
such as relocations and supplying water to desert Bighorn (Festa-Bianchet, 2008; Arizona Game 
and Fish, 2014), abundance has risen.  
 
The horns of rams are larger than those of females and are a popular trophy sought by sportsmen 
(California Fish and Game, 2014). In the wild, these horns are used for fighting, feeding, and 
protection. One recurring admonition of hunted game animals is that human are driving artificial 
evolution or ‘genetic manipulation’ by removing fit phenotypes from the population (Baldus et 
al., 2008; Festa-Bianchet, 2009). Coltman (2003) conducted a study on rocky mountain Bighorn 
sheep, concluding that selective pressures from hunting have altered traits and fitness over time, 
reducing population performance. It is countered that environmental factors, including nutrition, 
determine fitness and that females, which cannot be hunted, contribute half of the genes (Baldus 
et al., 2008). To allow more time for fit males to spread their genes, age parameters are often 
accounted for in trophy scoring. In other ungulates trophy hunting may disrupt territorial and 
mating behavior, skew sex ratio, and reduce fecundity (Loveridge et al., 2007). A study on sheep 
response to human interactions and found that in general sheep avoided roads and reaction was 
most intense when neared by a person on foot over motor vehicles (Papouchis et al., 2001). 
NGOs are working with Wyoming, Montana, and Idaho state agencies, the US Forest Service, 
and the National Park Service to examine how interactions with other species, like people, 
wolves, and nonnative mountain goats could impact sheep. As such programs demonstrate, the 
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sport hunting industry around Bighorn sheep is backed by a robust institution that affords 
protection and support for using wildlife sustainably. 
  
Governance System and Outcomes. In 1917, hunting of Bighorn sheep ceased because 
of low population levels in Baja California Sur, which later forced a band throughout the country 
in 1922. The first authorized hunt was reinstated in 1969, and the annual season continued 
regularly until 1990 when a presidential decree cited insufficient biological knowledge on 
Bighorn sheep for hunting to persist.  
 
Sport hunting in the US is a well-established system of regulation, enforcement, and protection. 
When unregulated hunting can cause ecological damage, but when regulated, it can contribute to 
species recovery, as happened with wild turkey (Meleagris gallopavo) and the beaver (Castor 
canadensis) (Loveridge et al., 2007). In states in which Bighorn sheep are found, conservative 
numbers of hunting tags are distributed to licensed hunters and all states require that trophies be 
marked for identification as a way of tracking the origin of animals and penalizing poaching 
(Festa-Bianchet, 2008). Agencies claim that only when deemed safe to the population are 
permits granted. Indeed, the sale or auction of a single tag can be quite lucrative, as people are 
willing to pay more for better trophies (Festa-Bianchet and Lee, 2009). Hunters spend lavishly 
on costs associated with their practice. Expenditures by US hunters in 2011 totaled $33.7 billion, 
and hunters have paid up to $160,000 for a single sheep (Loveridge et al., 2007). An 11% tax 
ordered by the Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act (1937) on ammunition and equipment 
serve many purposes, like hunter education and safety courses, wildlife conservation, purchasing 
wildlife refuges, and social improvement projects. What is more, there is low leakage of funds. 
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Grimm (2002) submits that investments in infrastructure are considerably lower for hunting 
reserves than photo-tourism and hunting areas have slowed poaching and the displacement of 
wild land with agriculture. 
 
In some cases, hunting reserves can be an alternative to national parks because they can be 
located in remote, less scenic areas without requiring sophisticated management and 
infrastructure (Baldus, 2008). Land owners are responsible for good stewardship and they have 
an incentive to do so since clientele and revenue are dependent upon a healthy, attractive 
population. Sometimes good land management and wildlife conservation are joint endeavors 
(Loveridge et al., 2007). Because Bighorn sheep are in rugged terrain, it takes a dedicated hunter 
to organize a trip and track down prey. This investment may weed out haphazard shooting 
incidences or unskilled hunters from depleting ram, especially to any excessive degree (Russell, 
1973). Species are also protected under the Lacey Act of 1900, ratified by the US with the 
objective to prevent non-native introductions and to protect game species. The act makes it 
illegal to trade or transfer wildlife, fish, and plants that are taken by unlawful means or that are 
prohibited to be taken from one territory to another (US Department of the Interior, 2011). 
Overall, the US recreational hunting industry has the clout and experience with the backing of 
sufficient ecological evidence to adequately regulate sustainable use of wildlife.  
 
CASE 2:  AFRICAN WHITE RHINO MANAGEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Resource Units and Resource System. White rhinos (Ceratotherium simum) inhabit four 
countries:  South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Kenya. Their habitat features thick bushes 
and flat terrain of the savannah, and their continual grazing on short grasses alters the 
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surrounding ecosystem (Waldram et al., 2008). There are approximately 20,000 white rhinos in 
South Africa and the species is considered ‘near threatened’ by the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) (Biggs et al., 2013). The main 
threats to the white rhino population are human encroachment, habitat degradation, poaching, 
and the indirect effect of low captive fecundity rates on population conservation (naturally, a 
mature female will give birth every two to three years) (WWF, 2014; Patisaul, 2012). White 
rhinos have two horns that are highly coveted. Most of this species resides in national parks, 
where tourism is popular, or on game ranches, which sell rights to hunt rhinos and other species 
on privately owned land.  
 
Governance System and Outcomes. The history of rhino management is one familiar 
with a wide variety of conservation tactics, some of which are economically oriented. A new use 
for agricultural land called ‘game farming’ or ‘game ranching’ became prominent in the 1960s 
partially out of fear of shrinking wildlife abundance in national parks (Boyes, 2013). Unlike 
many other countries in the region, South African game ranches were the advent of privatization 
of formerly public wildlife resources, a change that was illustrative of the profitability of 
stewarding wild lands (Duffy, 2000). They were stocked with the big five game species (lion, 
elephant, Cape buffalo, leopard, and rhinos) for meat and sport hunting. At the time, admission 
into state-owned parks, which came about earlier in the century, was expensive and precluded 
the entertainment of a broader populace. To earn more revenue, the government subsidized 
permits for rhinos, allowing parks to sell surplus game to private individuals who could also 
relieve some of the financial burden from the state. Commercial hunting of rhinos was forbidden 
by CITES in 1977 (Biggs et al., 2013; Inskipp and Gillett, 2005), but in 1985, rhinos were legally 
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auctioned off, collecting a high profit compared to selling hunting permits alone. By 1990, rhino 
auction profits increased by ten-fold to an average of $50,000, and in 2001, South African game 
farming earned $44 million (Martin, 2012; Lindsay et al., 2008).  
 
Countries like South Africa also chose to capitalize on tourism. Because of these two 
opportunities, game ranching and tourism, land stewardship became a profitable venture (Duffy, 
2000). Parks offered photography, tours, and animal observing that today are booming. Photo-
tourism also comprises a large portion of GDP, however photo-tourism tends to dissipate during 
political turmoil and it is not possible in some areas that can easily accommodate hunters 
(Loveridge et al., 2007). Besides safaris and wild game, another market for African wildlife is far 
grimmer. The illegal, underground trade in animals and animal-derived products is pervasive and 
takes many forms, from legal to illicit, formal to informal, small scale within communities to 
trafficking that spans continents, and for creatures as diverse as Chinese pangolins, orangutans, 
and polar bears (Oldfield, 2003). Illegal wildlife trading is an $11 billion annual industry (Allen, 
2012), which suggests the prominence of this global issue.  
 
Black market demand for rhino horn stabilized in the 1990s after its surge from the 1960s-80s 
because of generational shifts in preferences and several decade’s worth of cultivating 
environmental stewardship and compliance within the community (Martin, 2011). However, a 
recent resurgence has prompted stricter regulations. Today, a permit is required for any right to a 
rhino (Conrad, 2012). As of 2011, live rhinos were valued at $780 million on the black market 
(Martin, 2011). About 80% of world’s rhinos are in South Africa, and many are in Kruger 
National Park where more than half of South Africa’s rhino poaching incidents take place. There 
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were 13 individual losses in 2007, 333 in 2010, 448 in 2011, 668 in 2012, and ostensibly over 
1,000 in 2013 (Smith, 2014). As a result of the high price of absconding illegal wildlife products, 
poaching rates rose concurrent with the cost of rhino horn in illegal Asian markets, where most 
of the demand originates. Botswana, a country professing to never have had a rhino poaching 
incident, will receive possibly 100 of South Africa’s rhinos in effort to curtail population decline 
in that country.  
 
Illegal wildlife trafficking has had an impact on human communities as well as species 
conservation. Black markets drain potential money from communities, finance transnational 
crime and even terrorism, and undermine the stability and opportunities of countries from which 
targeted species originate. Poachers can also pose a danger to rangers tasked with protecting 
wildlife. These crimes mostly occur in places where corruption and political unrest compound 
the conventional challenges of government (Conrad, 2012). Last year, the US ratified a 
presidential task force to enhance federal laws directly related to the trafficking of elephants and 
rhinos, underscoring the importance of this issue to human security (Eilperin, 2013). It is also a 
focal project for some development and environment NGOs to stymie this clandestine industry. 
Periods of mitigation in wildlife poaching have been possible due to the efforts of organizations 
like TRAFFIC, a wildlife trade monitoring network affiliated with World Wildlife Fund (WWF) 
and IUCN. TRAFFIC focuses on monitoring and sanctioning in Asia and Africa, and it is the 
prevailing example of command and control (WWF, 2012). The key to reversing the governance 
struggle over African big game is greater attention to Asian countries from where demand is 
coming because poaching and the lucrative illegal trade are driving the imperilment of rhinos. 
With this tempered, South Africa might be able to have sound resource governance. 
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Users and Interactions. In this SES, the social setting is comprised of affluent trophy 
hunters typically from out of country, South Africans running the parks in the service industry 
and serving as park rangers and knowledgeable staff, and private game ranch owners. White 
rhino management is different across national contexts. All African countries condemn poaching, 
but they vary in whether consumptive uses are deemed acceptable as a means to fund wildlife 
conservation. Kenya’s model of conservation contrasts with South Africa in this way. Instead of 
game ranching and sport hunting, Kenya opts for poisoning horns and installing microchips to 
trace rhinos and monitor the population. In December of 2013, The Kenyan president signed the 
Wildlife Conservation and Management Act (No. 47 of 2013). The new act, mobilized by the 
state-run Kenyan Wildlife Service, imposes a fine of roughly $230,000 and a life imprisonment 
sentence for poaching threatened species. This bold proclamation is a continuation of the 
country’s rigorous, no tolerance approach to the protection of wildlife. Since Kenya’s push for 
commercial bans for all big game species in the 1970s, wild game populations have declined by 
60% and, for wildlife overall (carnivore and herbivore species), that number is 70% in the past 
33 years - trends that are attributed to human activity. One side argues trade bans have led to 
sharp falls in wildlife populations (Ogutu et al., 2011) while the opposition, like the International 
Fund for Animal Welfare, retorts that numbers have actually climbed (Martin, 2012). In truth, 
downward trends in wildlife plague all of South and East Africa.  
 
As this polarizing debate illustrates, some conservationists and wildlife advocates are not 
supportive of this kind of commodification of wildlife. South Africa’s adoption of trophy hunting 
in lieu of a stand-alone tourism industry was a practical move that had to be justified to parties 
antagonistic towards the idea that wildlife could be a commercial resource. Opposition to trades 
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in wildlife claim that sacrificing an individual animal is an ethical violation that tarnishes the 
value of nature and effects ideas on what actions towards non-human life are permissible. If it is 
okay to lose one, at what number do we stop? Prices for wildlife may be biased against non-
anthropocentric stances because they are forced to make an economic tradeoff with wildlife 
when one may not exist for someone believing environmental values transcend monetary 
valuation (Spash, 1997). 
 
Actors, such as the WWF and Humane Society International, who promote the protection of 
wildlife and wild lands, reject environmental markets. Rather, they prefer trade bans, which are 
intended to stabilize and maintain secure populations by forbidding any harm to wildlife. They 
caution that allowing trade and “one-off sales” will misleadingly condone the ownership of these 
products, thereby stimulating illegal trade and additional poaching, a concern that is even more 
disconcerting than the animal rights view (Fisher, 2004). One-off sales are short-term sales of 
confiscated or abandoned wildlife products and are supported by IUCN, CITES, and the US Fish 
and Wildlife Service. Bulte and van Kooten (1999) and later Rivalan et al. (2007) found a 
positive relationship between up-listing a species (the equivalent to a trade ban) and the number 
of illegal trade transactions (JE and JA, 2007). In contrast, a separate study showed that there is 
correlation not causation between one-off sales and elephant mortality in Zimbabwe and Kenya, 
countries that support and oppose trade bans, respectively (Bulte, 2007). The back-and-forth has 
left the debate on an ambiguous note but reinforces the need for broad stakeholder participation, 
which will reveal the plurality of interests invested in the wildlife population for the best attempt 
at an acceptable path towards sustainable use.  
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Attitudes towards game animals espoused by African locals are generally attributed to human-
wildlife conflict, cultural influences (e.g., rural poor believing wildlife attacks are elites actually 
controlling or acting as the animals), and environmental factors (e.g., lack of alternative food 
sources) (Dickman, 2010). This is a narrow description of how Africans view wildlife that does 
not address the nuances in their attitudes, though it is one part of human-wildlife relationships in 
the region that is important to the study of the market for white rhinos. Because many locals are 
pastoralists, their concerns are related to how to reap the most benefit from their land (Martin, 
2012). Just as coyotes, wolves, and other predators are a perturbation to US farmers and 
homeowners (Suryawanshi et al., 2013), landowners in southern Africa have negative attitudes 
towards surrounding megafauna. Tigers, rhinos, and elephants cause harm to livestock and game, 
raid and damage crops, transmit disease, and sometimes attack humans (Dickman, 2010). 
Community members will often retaliate by opting for lethal control, so to build tolerance, the 
financial benefits accrued from hunting and tourism must be proportional to or greater than the 
loss from wildlife damage (Loveridge et al., 2007).  
 
Alternatively, several conflict resolution strategies have been tested (e.g., physical separation, 
guarding assets, habitat use and modification, behavior modification of species or people, buffer 
resources, and non-lethal control) (Dickman, 2010). Mitigating the exaggerated response and 
promoting conservation requires a system that accommodates the interests of a variety of 
stakeholders to create an incentive structure for saving animals rather than eliminating them 
(Trebilcock et al., 2012). Tourism and trophy hunting markets are fueled by affluent foreigners 
that hold different views from locals. A possible way to have better success at rule enforcement 
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requires clearly defining, communicating, and resolving disparate attitudes and expectations of 
the locals with the objectives of state and private actors enacting the rules. 
 
CASE 3:  ATLANTIC BLUEFIN TUNA 
Resource Units and Resource System. There are several stocks of Bluefin tuna but, for 
the purposes of this narrative, I chose to focus on Atlantic Bluefin (ABFT) (Thunnus thynnus), 
which is managed as eastern and western stocks. Together, this population comprises the bulk of 
the species (IUCN). ABFT are large, pelagic predators (>3 m and up to 900 kg) (Fromentin and 
Powers, 2005). Like many of the world’s fisheries, the Atlantic Bluefin stock is being decimated 
by industrial-scale fishing, mostly driven by commercial fish farming in the Mediterranean, US, 
Canada, and Japan (IUCN). They are particularly profitable for their demand in sushi, but are 
also heavily subject to bycatch by deep sea long-line fisheries (Fromentin and Powers, 2005; Teo 
and Block, 2010). Because fisheries are widespread and fishing intensity varies by area, control 
is difficult (ICATT, 2005). Quotas, or total sustainable harvest levels, have been enforced since 
1982, yet the stock has suffered precipitous decline in just over three generations, reducing 
biomass by at least 51%. It is now considered endangered, even though current stock estimates 
are uncertain (Fromentin et al., 2005). Uncertainty, however, would not be justifiable reason to 
side-step cautionary or more stringent management decisions (Myers and Worm, 2003).  
 
Individual ABFT have far-ranging dispersal patterns (>2000 km in a single season) between 
locations in the Caribbean and up and down the Eastern Sea Board (Block et al., 2011). Adults, 
quite rapidly, are able to travel vast distances to spawn in the Gulf of Mexico, to which they 
demonstrate site fidelity, and breed in the Mediterranean Sea (Block et al., 2001). Though they 
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can tolerate large temperature gradients, Bluefin are sensitive to environmental fluctuations and 
susceptible to the near-term impacts of global climate change (Fromentin et al., 2005). 
Additionally, life history attributes, like “slower growth, later maturity, shorter spawning season, 
larger size and longer life span…make ABFT more vulnerable to exploitation than tropical tuna” 
(Fromentin and Powers, 2005, p. 290). 
 
Users and Interactions. From its inception, fisheries management was looked upon in a 
different light than other forms of wildlife management. A fish is a single-use resource, and the 
foremost interest is in its meat. Because fish are not considered charismatic and are a dietary 
staple for 1 billion people (UNEP 2011), with very little debate, they have namely been a good 
for consumption. International commercial fishing fleets are the main users in this system. 
Harvesting level and effort of these users are based on the price and demand of tuna on the 
market, and often lobbying takes place to raise fishing quotas (Grafton, 2006). Consistent and 
heavy consumer demand for predatory fish creates an incentive for industries to exploit, which is 
the nature of open access CPRs. Many global fisheries are on the brink of collapse because of 
singularly economic-based incentive structures that have encouraged short-term rewards over 
sustainability (Sanchirico and Wilen, 2007; Costello et al., 2008). As will be discussed next, the 
best situation to mitigate extirpation of large fish species is to have cooperation and collaborative 
agreements.  
 
Governance System and Outcomes. Most US fisheries are managed by regional 
councils under the umbrella of the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), which as of 1990, 
the Secretary of Commerce has overseen. The Highly Migratory Species (HMS) Management 
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Division of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) regulates Atlantic 
HMS. For HMS, like Bluefin tuna, institutional agreements are challenged more so than a near-
shore fishery with defined boundaries. HMS are defined as “creatures that are believed to 
undertake extensive migrations and that carry individuals through many coastal zones as well as 
the high seas throughout their life” (Hilborn and Sibert, 1988, p. 36). ‘High seas’ refers to 
international waters, meaning territory beyond 200 nautical miles off coasts (UN, 1982). That a 
single stock of Bluefin tuna may cross paths with fishermen from a number of nations highlights 
the absolute need for international agreements (Sandler, 2004). Because of the large spatial scale 
of tuna, layers of governance with congruent policies are the best attempt at ameliorating 
‘tragedy of the commons’.  
 
Bluefin fishing is banned in the Gulf of Mexico, yet they continue to be caught accidentally in 
those waters. The height of this activity occurs during spawning season, January to June, a 
troubling notion given that tuna exhibit strong habitat preferences for these areas (Stanford 
University, 2010). High seas fisheries have yet to acknowledge the sensitivity of tuna at site- and 
time-specific life stages by siphoning access and implementing gear restrictions (Teo and Block, 
2010). Fisheries mismanagement goes beyond depletion of a single species; removal of marine 
predators has cascading ecological impacts on food web dynamics (Block et al., 2011). 
 
In 1966, International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) was signed, 
establishing an intergovernmental organization for sustainable management of several tuna 
species. In this capacity, ICCAT conducts stock assessments on different species of Atlantic 
tunas, swordfish, and billfish. It has been widely criticized for failing to deliver on its mission to 
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resuscitate stocks, sustain fisheries, and deliberate quotas to maximize harvest yields since 
alarmingly low population levels were detected in 1950 (Hilborn and Sibert, 1988). Furthermore, 
ICCAT does not have the full participation of nations bordering the Atlantic. “Most Latin 
American nations have withdrawn from [the agreement], and their own fishermen are essentially 
unregulated in their own waters” (Hilborn and Sibert, 1988, p. 31). While signatories provide 
biological and economic tuna data annually, non-member nations are not under contract to 
regulate fishing in compliance with the organization’s standards, and there are no formal 
sanctions to apprehend defection (Fromentin, 2005). These discrepancies are a poignant juncture 
for HMS, like Bluefin tuna and whales. 
 
CASE 4:  POTENTIAL FOR A WHALE CONSERVATION MARKET 
Users and Interactions. While all commercial whaling is banned and few stakeholders 
still have a vested interest in preserving the age-old activity, whaling persists in three exceptional 
cases: among aboriginal subsistence communities for which there are stipulations to confirm this 
status, whaling with a scientific permit, and whaling under the objection clause. All exceptions 
are liable to a quota (IWC, 2014). Though IWC meetings are inclusive, involving broad 
stakeholder participation, the organization is fully aware of its current compromised 
circumstances and regularly convenes to address them (The RMP, 2013). Because Western 
countries have a strong voice in the IWC, their inclination towards whale preservation colors the 
political landscape (Hirata, 2004). Animal rights, certain conservation activists support the 
widely held claim that whales are superior entities worthy of moral respect. On the other hand, 
whales are heavily sought after among select groups worldwide for their economic and cultural 
value. Some subsistence communities (recognized by the IWC in Denmark, Russia, St. Vincent 
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and the Grenadines, and the US) regard whales with reverence but also continue the tradition of 
killing them for nutrition and to sustain culturally significant ceremonial hunts (Reeves, 2002).  
 
Controlled harvest of aboriginal whaling has effectively met community demand and ecological 
objectives of replenishing stocks (Roman et al., 2013). The moratorium is unsettled, however, 
mostly because of commercial industries in Iceland and Norway and scientific whaling practiced 
by Japan. Recent studies affirm that Japan contributes no substantive data or scientific insight to 
the field (Mangel, 2013). Reportedly, most whale meat they collect goes unsold because 
Japanese consumer interest in the protein has sunk dramatically since the 1960s (IFAW, 2013). 
On March 31, 2014 the International Court of Justice ruled to ban Japan’s whaling program in 
the Southern Ocean where, since 1988, they have captured 10,000 minke and other whales 
annually (Tabuchi and Simons, 2014). The ruling does not pertain to Japanese whaling in other 
regions, which is slated to continue, but it is a symbolic step towards eliminating illegal and 
deleterious activity taking place in the oceans. 
 
Around the world, whales have come to represent a connection to nature and a window into a 
novel environment (Kalland, 2011). Whale watching, a recreational, non-consumptive 
opportunity to observe cetaceans in their natural environment, is gaining popularity. It began 
around 1955 and has blossomed into an activity that 119 countries and an estimated 13 million 
people take part in annually (Herrera and Hoagland, 2006; IFAW, 2013). The industry employs 
roughly 13,000 people worldwide, earned $2.1 billion in 2009, and is becoming a lucrative 
alternative livelihood in developing countries (Cisneros et al., 2010).  It is not an unalloyed good, 
however; heavy investment in ships and skilled labor and possible ship-whale collisions are 
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some of the costs of the enterprise (Kalland, 2011). However, for those who value whales more 
alive than dead, whale watching is a promising tool that may be combined with other 
conservation strategies. 
 
Resource Units and Resource System. The biophysical context of whales strongly 
influences acceptability, participation, and feasibility of a whale market. Whale management is 
marked by a host of challenges because of cetacean biology and behavior. Firstly, whales inhabit 
the open ocean, making them common-pool resources that are non-excludable and subtractive. 
Second, they are highly migratory, which limits the capacity for institutions to effectively uphold 
proper incentive structures. Like other large marine species, whales are an integral link in marine 
trophic systems (Roman and McCarthy, 2010). The killing of a few individual whales has large 
impacts on their ocean-wide ecosystem. The magnitude of this effect has implications for species 
with long life spans and births of a few offspring interspersed over time, intimating that it could 
cause higher order effects at the community or ecosystem level (Lewison et al., 2004). These 
concerns are punctuated by heightening demand in growing economies, like China, where rising 
income corresponds to increased consumption of luxury food items, like fish and a variety of 
exotic products (Gale and Huang, 2007). Hence, individual animal welfare is connected to 
larger-level concern over populations.   
 
Other salient threats to whales include bycatch, vessel strikes, pollution, climate change, plastic 
ingestion, disease, prey depletion, entanglement, and acoustic disturbances (Notarbartolo-di-
sciara, 2013; MMC). Each is exacerbated by growing human populations, especially in coastal 
regions. Also, species stationed at the top of the food chain accumulate high contaminant loads, 
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and cetaceans are always in a state of constant uncertainty because accurate population data is 
limited (Roman et al., 2013). One of the problems, excessive bycatch, elucidates the lack of 
enforcement troubling marine management. Since 30-40 years ago when targeted hunting was 
more prolific, the norm is now that non-targeted, yet deliberate catches are most common. 
Hunting overall has not relented because secondary catches are still consumed, targeted or not. 
The total capture rate, despite the method or intention, remains high and is motivated by ill-
enforced consequences (Robards, 2011) due in no small part to whales roaming open access 
territory. The moratorium has eliminated commercial whaling except for loopholes, so it has 
been effective but could be strengthened.  
 
Governance System and Outcomes. A full-fledged moratorium took effect in 1986 to 
serve as a temporary fix until catch limits could be implemented. The moratorium partly 
stemmed from the shortage of biological data and reservation over the acceptability of whaling. 
Buttressing the moratorium, today there are marine protected areas on the high seas and 
nationally defined marine sanctuaries (IWC, 2014). For example, the US has the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) 1972 Marine Mammal Protection Act 
(MMPA) (NMFS, 2012). The MMPA placed a moratorium on all marine mammals, which 
encompasses 125 combined species of cetaceans and pinnipeds. It also prohibits the take of 
marine mammals within US waters, take by US citizens, and the introduction of marine 
mammals or their products to the US by non-US citizens. The MMPA was amended in 1994 
authorizing controlled, incidental catches of marine mammals by fisheries operations. Whale 
populations have recovered since the moratorium and stringent measures like the MMPA, though 
the IWC’s leverage on the international front is waning (SH, 2007; Roman et al., 2013). 
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If the reinstatement of whaling is judged favorably by popular vote of signatory nations, the IWC 
has prepared a scientifically robust plan called the Revised Management Procedure (RMP). The 
RMP was devised as a method to calculate safe harvest levels and advise on the sustainable 
harvesting of abundant populations using a catch limit algorithm by region, along with other 
harvest specifications. The majority of IWC members, however, currently approves of the 
moratorium (IWC, 2014). Still, releasing the ban in favor of a market would be aligned with 
stated objectives, and in fact, could be a short-term solution to hold over decisions on instituting 
the RMP. The working group on this policy was established in 1994. As demonstrated by the 
historical feedbacks between attitudes towards wildlife, scientific knowledge, economic drivers, 
and policy for whaling, it is important to understand how value systems factor in to a debate that 
has become dominated by ethical reasoning. Revisiting IWC policy is imperative to boost the 
institution out of a suboptimal, fixed pathway. 
 
While policies operate on relatively short time scales, ethical approaches take a slower, more 
enduring route to change behavior. Until social and attitudinal shifts occur, an improved whaling 
regime can rectify divisive political views not by developing a single, uniform policy but by 
adopting a mixed-management system. As with the other CPRs, commercial whaling is 
enmeshed in broader social, economic, and ecological issues and processes, and must be dealt 
with sensitively. Even so, conscientious objectors to the moratorium are in the minority, so a 
market for whales is a curious imposition on a regime holding fast to all-out whale preservation. 
Most concerning is that starting a market could displace moral calculations with economic ones, 
and in doing so, stimulate a market that is already dissipating (Sandel, 2005; Minteer and Gerber, 
2013; IFAW, 2013; Gerber et al., 2014
B
). As of writing, a market for whales is a concept in 
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circulation that finds patchy support among practitioners, scientists, and lawmakers. It remains a 
talking point in IWC meetings, as the Commissioner is well-informed on the proposition and has, 
by no means, blunted the idea.  
 
Currently, the US Coast Guard and NMFS have not been able to adequately discourage 
violations in the way of bycatch, illegal killing, and oil and gas operations (Roman et al., 2013; 
MMC, 2012). To be sure, the IWC should remain the leader in international whale management. 
The presence of a strong leader can elicit better cooperation among involved parties, making 
progress more probable (Sandler, 2004). The IWC has overlapping interests in wild and 
endangered species with CITES, which entered into force in 1973 to conserve the world’s 
biodiversity. With its network of 178 member nations (compared to 89 IWC members), observer 
delegates from NGOs and IGOs, and scientists, CITES can assist the IWC mission in collecting 
and disseminating information on marine species and tracking stakeholder exchanges associated 
with the wildlife trade. In 2013, CITES met to consider adding traded marine fish to the list of 
species they protect, which further validates the prospective role of CITES in marine megafauna 
management (Vincent et al., 2013). Though there is CITES relevance to involving and other 
multilateral agreements, such as the IUCN and the Convention on Conservation of Migratory 
Species, these agreements can only be followed voluntarily and invariably confront the same 
issue of compliance as the IWC.  
 
Market Futures for Marine Species. The institutional hurdles of markets for cetaceans 
do not diminish the potential for market mechanisms to regulate harvest of other marine 
megafauna (i.e. sharks, sea turtles, and rays). Because these species inhabit existing fishery zones 
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(and are at risk because of intensive human activity), they are more amenable to rights-based 
management. In fact, species that have a limited range, like gray whales (Eschrichtius robustus) 
that stay within EEZs of the North Pacific and the Northeast Atlantic minke whale (Balaenoptera 
acutorostrata), could be managed via the implementation of property rights. NOAA employs a 
number of tactics to “protect marine resources and their habitat and help safeguard the health of 
seafood consumers and the livelihoods of coastal communities” (Fisheries, NOAA, 2013). In 
addition to programs like protected areas and habitat conservation, NOAA seeks to expand catch 
share programs, and it is currently considering them for other marine megafauna (e.g., Atlantic 
sharks (NMFS, 2011), Baja sea turtles (Senko et al., 2013)), which highlights the emerging 
importance of wildlife markets in marine settings. Instituting systems of compensation or catch 
shares where quotas are already in place for large marine species, such as sharks and sea turtles, 
could be an improvement to the efficiency and accountability of marine regulation and other at-
risk, near-shore marine populations (Essington, 2012). 
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CHAPTER 5 
SYNTHESIS OF CASE STUDY FINDINGS 
The SES framework highlights the relationship between the biophysical backdrop of a given 
CPR and the policy arena. Acknowledging the inextricable link between social and ecological 
endeavors is inherently complex, so Ostrom encouraged designing governance to suit system 
complexity rather than dampening it. For a CPR scenario yielding suboptimal outcomes in which 
the biophysical conditions and the attributes of the community are effectively locked-in, the 
institutional design must change (Dietz et al., 2003). To do so, actors should reformulate their 
collective agreements to perform better, and in conservation, this means considering alternative 
pathways for species management. The case studies just described shed light on the feasibility 
and acceptability for wildlife markets to serve a role in SES governance. I extracted the SES 
second-tier variables relevant to wildlife markets (Table 1) and describe the relationships 
between the four core subsystems (Figure 3). 
 
Long-term sustainability of a wildlife population and the institution governing human activity 
depends heavily on rules matching the attributes of the resource system, resource units, and 
users. Based on this reasoning, in this section, I provide an overview of common features across 
the case studies that showed to be particularly important for whether the institution is relatively 
successful or not. This rote categorization as a success or failure is a simplification of the 
complex situations of wildlife management. Nonetheless, it aids in my goal of diagnosing the 
strengths and weaknesses of the SES system, which would allow me to later examine those 
linkages more closely. 
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Figure 3. Relevant second-level variables and interactions between core subsystems for wildlife 
markets. Adapted from the Social-Ecological Systems framework (Ostrom, 2009). Highlighted 
in red are the variables found to be most important for the success of a wildlife market. An 
asterisk indicates a feature unique to this analysis that is not part of the original framework. 
 
 
Table 1. Wildlife market case studies characterized using subsystem variables of the Social-
Ecological Systems framework. An asterisk indicates a feature unique to this analysis that is not 












Resource System (RS) 
Size of resource system large small herds inhabit 
a small area; the 
population 




Clarity of system boundaries yes; territory for each 
species is generally 
understood 
yes; fenced 
parks or game 
ranches 
yes; territory 
in parks and 











Predictability of system  
dynamics 
low high high intermediate 











Resource Units (RU)  
Threats* habitat degradation, 
















Resource unit mobility High; depending on 
the species, individuals 
move thousands of 
kilometers in a single year 
low Intermediate







kilometers in a 
single year 
Growth or replacement rate slow slow slow slow 
Economic value intermediate 
(regionally) 
high high high 
Number of units/ status statuses varies; many 











Spatial and temporal 
distribution 
global local local regional 
 
Users (U)  
Number of users 13,000 employed and 
13 million (average) 
participants in whale 
watching yearly; few 
nations cull whales 
18,500 







big game hunting 
in the US (2011) 
thousands of 
consumers of tuna 
meat 





keeps rates low 
heavy 









Knowledge of SES some data but varies 
by species; generally 
incomplete 
complete complete generally 
incomplete 
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Government organizations varies by country; 
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Monitoring and sanctioning 
processes 
none that are formal; 
social enforcement 
penalty for 
poaching is a fine 
and prison 
penalty for 
poaching is a 
fine 
none that are 
formal; social 
enforcement 
Harvesting levels of diverse 
users 
Japan: high; Norway 









and Japan  
Conflict among users yes; over compliance 













Users. From the SES variables, mental models, history of use, and knowledge of the SES 
are the most important determinants of institutional success. Stakeholders whom would ideally 
become shareholders in a market espouse a mixture of environmental attitudes that manifest in 
diverse preferences for types of species management. Generally, there are distinct camps of 
actors:  those who seek to preserve animal populations and those that would elect to harvest 
them. Within each of these designations is a spectrum of viewpoints regarding the use of 
animals, spanning from animal welfare advocates and conservation scientists to subsistence and 
commercial harvesters. Stakeholders also include recreationists, local advocates, and larger scale 
conservation groups. Support for mammal preservation, especially mammals perceived to be 
charismatic, is often deeper and more vocal than that for other taxa, like reptiles and 
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invertebrates (Kellert, 1983). Universal compliance, however, is rare when dealing with shared 
resources, especially for resources that raise deep ethical quandaries, like charismatic wildlife 
(Minteer and Manning, 1999). In fact, the moral acceptability of markets for such species has 
implications that are subject to scrutiny.  
 
Preservationists motivated by ethical commitments to species protection suggest that a market 
for wildlife fails to account for hidden costs and benefits and that it simply buys into the narrow 
view that wildlife should be valued for their economic ends. Minteer and Gerber (2013) 
examined the issue of whether we should consider markets for whales and other species in light 
of widely held views about their ecological and ethical significance. Although markets could 
appease a fraction of stakeholders oriented towards the monetary facets of natural resources, it is 
also possible that commodification of a non-market good erodes our moral commitment to non-
human species. The inappropriate use of wildlife markets risks undervaluation of the targeted 
good by preventing proper expression of a fuller set of values towards non-human nature 
(Sandel, 2005). In response, one could question whether it matters that a market misses the full 
spectrum of values for whales as long as it works for conservation and does not undermine the 
capacity for other values (including moral values) to be realized (Minteer and Gerber, 2013). 
Other concerns about wildlife markets voiced are more economically focused, which Gerber et 
al. address (2014
B
). For example, conservation market critics assert that some resource users 
object to markets and would not participate while others may free ride on the contribution of 
like-minded stakeholders and opt out of a market, leading to sub-optimal outcomes. If 
conservation organizations overtake the market, wildlife shares would essentially become 





I suspect that private individuals and organizations seeking to preserve wildlife fall onto a sliding 
scale of environmental ethics that dictate market participation. On one end reside parties that are 
morally compelled to protect wildlife and hold all or some species in the highest moral regard. 
Those of this conviction reject a market, believing animals transcend this type of valuation 
(Nunes and van den Bergh, 2001). Some safari tourists, whale watchers, and even people who 
will never have these experiences vehemently oppose any killing. The other side consists of 
parties that are motivated to conserve species, and embrace nontraditional methods of 
conservation among other strategies. This type of scenario can be expected should a wildlife 
market, as described for whales, be enacted. Placement of stakeholder groups along this 
continuum can only be accomplished through interviews to elicit ethical and behavioral 
responses.  
 
In some of the preceding case studies, actors shared a common mental model for how to use 
wildlife sustainably, if use is desirable at all. This was exemplified by hunting organizations, 
wildlife managers, state agencies, private landowners, and hunters whom are the primary actors 
in Bighorn sheep management. Relatively little concern is voiced by conservation NGOs and 
animal rights activists for Bighorn sheep relative to white rhinos and whales that strongly 
advocate non-anthropocentric viewpoints. It is clear that ethical and moral arguments against 
consumption of Bighorn sheep, rhinos, and whales and markets that condone such behavior are 
much louder than those for less charismatic megafauna, like fish. For species that are less 
charismatic, we would expect the extent of free riding to be more severe, suggesting even more 
limitations of the use of catch shares to conserve non-extractive uses of wildlife (Smith et al., 
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2014). Stakeholders of big game and cetaceans are international, whereas those of bighorn sheep 
are mostly in the US with some in Mexico and Canada. More international representation 
perhaps brings with it a greater breadth of perspectives in decision making. High stakeholder 
heterogeneity can promote comprehensive and diverse planning, but in this instance, abject 
differences prevent convergent policies. Heterogeneity may also increase transaction costs if 
there is less trust and more conflicting viewpoints (Sandler, 2004). Ethics will not preclude the 
formation of a market for wildlife, as evidenced by white rhino management, but they will 
influence interactions and outcomes. 
 
The importance of the resource to the community impacts what policies are acceptable and likely 
to succeed. Struggling economies in South and East Africa prioritize strategies for protecting 
wildlife that offer financial benefits to fuel local communities. That the recovery or sustainability 
of wildlife can pay for itself is a shared theme woven into the philosophy of big game markets. 
For species often seen as pests, as demonstrated by the case of white rhinos, there is an urge for 
local community members to kill animals rather than work with wardens to remove them. This 
heightens the need for proper enforcement. With top-down regimes, policing power comes at a 
cost without a sufficient source of revenue to support paying for those jobs and may ultimately 
disincentivize cooperation. Still, all policy must rest on a good scientific grasp of biology. The 
amount of available scientific knowledge varies by species. Bighorn sheep are still notoriously 
difficult to count due to scattered herds in hard to reach places (Monson and Allen, 1980), and 
pelagic species, by virtue of their location, are not well-studied. This information should be 
disseminated to consumers and the immediate community that is likely to interact with wildlife 
to form the basis of actions towards wildlife. The design of the rules, which take into account 
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user demands, must rely on knowledge of the SES to foster good stewardship or else actions may 
be detrimental to the resource. 
 
Governance System. The governance variables that stand out in wildlife management 
include intergovernmental agreements, monitoring and sanctioning processes, and property-
rights systems. Well-established policies are hard to change, as institutions that have matured 
over time are reinforced by instilled cultural and social practices and norms. ‘Historical 
institutionalism,’ as this phenomenon is termed, “conceives of public policymaking and political 
change as a discrete process, characterized by extended time periods of considerable stability - 
referred to as "path-dependency" - interrupted by turbulent, ‘formative moments’” (Peters et al., 
2005, p. 1276). Path dependency refers to the notion that an existing policy or similar ones tends 
to be favored over dramatic shifts. Incremental changes to the status quo, however, limit 
responses to better policies. This term has been used when referring to climate change (Shove, 
2010), energy technologies (Unruh, 2000), and health care (Wilsford, 1994). Incrementally, an 
institutional context may evolve into a market-friendly environment, but evolution takes time. 
Feedbacks move more quickly between outcomes of a social-ecological system and deliberation 
processes (e.g., setting the quota and allocating shares), whereas a lagged response occurs 
between outcomes and contextual variables (e.g., attitudes, values, and policies).  
 
South Africa’s conservation model since the 1960s integrates tourism and hunting towards 
economic ends and they are unlikely to forfeit this income generator for Kenya’s strictly non-
consumptive practices. Likewise, North American hunting crowds are reluctant to make changes 
for fear of memberships being revoked or increased work for practitioners. Decision-makers 
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limit themselves to the pool of possibilities that when assessing the success of policy is done by 
narrowing the policy alternatives to ones that are similar to the status quo and then studying how 
their consequences differ (Lindblom, 1959). To this point, the legal trade of rhino horns was 
pitched two decades ago in COP Cites 8 (Milner-Gulland and Leader-Williams, 1992) and is still 
contentious particularly between countries with conflicting models of conservation. The proposal 
for a whale market has been in circulation for just two years. How long will we debate the merit 
of this program for whales before action is taken? Parties are averse to change if current state is 
adequate and cost efficient (Libecap, 1993). Resource users that are satisfied with the status quo 
will likely be opposed to property rights that detract from their current benefits or at least the 
adoption of a new policy will elicit lobbies. 
 
Alternative sources of benefit to compensate the community and prevent assaults on wildlife are 
necessary (Hemson et al., 2009). Conrad (2012, p. 250) submits that, “some data suggest that 
animals on privately-held land suffer less poaching and overexploitation because of vested 
economic interests.” By installing property rights, “costs associated with protection are 
transferred from the social to private sectors” (Conrad, 2012, p. 250). Top-down control 
mechanisms that prohibit all use of wildlife increase the importance of enforcement but also 
make it more difficult and expensive, begging the question of whether alternative routes to 
protection, albeit controversial, trump standard operations. Command and control regimes are 
typically too rigid to cope with unpredictability of natural systems. Markets are more dynamic 
and can conform to human behavior as preferences and resource availability changes (Holling 
and Meffe, 1995). The conservation of threatened game species and habitats is successful when 
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markets are organized so that buyers of permits value the resource more highly than sellers of 
permits (Schuhmann and Schwabe, 2000). 
 
For Bighorn sheep, this has been achieved by the issuance of tags and quotas in some areas 
partnered with protected areas in state and federal parks. South Africa marries non-consumptive 
ecotourism with sport hunting industry, an alternative that involves extraction. Trophy hunting is 
prominent for Bighorn sheep, as well, but these animals are not the main attraction for visitors to 
US parks as big game are on African safaris. Legalizing the creation of property rights to wildlife 
can channel the generated wealth back into protection efforts. Markets may also be appropriate 
and particularly useful for populations located in places where tourism is not possible.  
 
In other situations, exploitation is desirable but, in the absence of a tourism industry, there 
remains forward-looking economic interest in saving the species from decline, as with Bluefin 
tuna. The benefits of devolving rights must outweigh costs of proper and effective 
implementation and enforcement. Limited entry is less costly than open access but, 
simultaneously, this may impose external costs on others (Schuhmann and Schwabe, 2000). 
Marine fishermen can often dissent with impunity because the biophysical context enables it. 
Policing in terrestrial settings is measurably easier because the resources are on governed and 
bounded territories; animals and user activity are more visible this way. In fact, the global 
commons are nearly impossible to manage well. The capacity of institutions at any scale to 
monitor and sanction activity that occurs on the open ocean is low and the expense of providing 
that public infrastructure is lofty. Unilateral action will not be affective solitarily. Domestic 
policies, like the MMPA, can jumpstart discussions abroad and expand into comprehensive 
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conservation agreements that retain the standards of a successful national program (Pannel, 
1990). Perhaps most obvious in the assessment of existing and potential wildlife markets is that 
whale and tuna management is less effective compared to that of bighorn and rhinos because of 
governance enabled by clearly defined jurisdictions in the later cases. 
 
Some prohibitory features of a market, therefore, are shared by all policy attempts to govern the 
marine commons no matter the strategy or species, while other policy nonstarters are unique to 
whales because of their special moral status. Today’s premier document on fisheries regulation, 
the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Managements Reauthorization Act (MSRA), 
was signed in 1976 to bolster fisheries management and protect marine resources, particularly 
from illegal activity. MSRA is infused with a mix of economic, social, and biological directives 
(Doremus, 1997). But this only applies to national waters. MSRA was last revised in 2006 and 
expired in 2013. With a pending amendment for 2014, the next version of MRSA is expected to 
forbid new catch shares programs in certain regions (US Congress, 2013). Without a market 
mechanism, other recovery strategies are being explored for fisheries management. Property 
rights constrain the amount of extraction, but limiting fishermen effort can subsequently reduce 
the total resource yield. “Where, when and how to harvest” is easier to police than how much 
(Anderies and Janssen, 2013, p. 524). Gear modifications reduce bycatch and entanglement and 
time limitations cut down on vessel-wildlife interactions and harvest volume (MMC, 2012).  
 
Interactions and Outcomes. The deliberation processes for designing markets hinge on 
the fair and transparent allocation of quotas (North, 1990). A market to protect exploited species 
is only as effective as its well-defined TAC calculated from scientific and quantitative models of 
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species data. Efficient allocation of the TAC settles competing demands between users and 
minimizes costs, but the level of the TAC itself is the aspect most responsible for protection. 
These contracts between users are based on harvesting levels of diverse users, and, in a whale 
conservation market, would change from year to year based on whether the market is dominated 
by use or nonuse values.  
 
Appropriating shares in fisheries, as a conservation market for whales would emulate, can be a 
political battle. It is based on either ‘grandfathering’, the most typical arrangement, and/ or 
auctions (Arnason, 2002; Pinkerton and Edwards, 2009). Anderson et al. (2010) assert that 
grandfathering, which grants rights based on past participation, is a more efficient mechanism 
than alternatives for quota allocation. Incumbents, they argue, have more experience and better 
knowledge of functional aspects of the fishery, leading to better outcomes. Although in this 
scheme auctioned shares will land in the hands of the highest bidder and reap a higher profit, 
these investments may be retained in the long run, posing a risk to the CPR. Inclusion of the 
grandfather provision, in contrast, still allows new users to engage, which would be obligatory in 
a whale conservation market because conservationists, who traditionally have not had access to 
shares of the TAC, would have the option to purchase rights. Rights would have to be 
grandfathered to whalers because historical users own the equipment and have the skill to whale, 
as this is a time- and resource-intensive endeavor. However, whaling has been banned since 1986 
and earlier for certain whale species, so those who have not been culling whales should not 
suffer for abiding to the moratorium, despite having the preference to hunt during that time 
period.  
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Effectively appropriating shares also bears on lobbying behavior and users’ obedience to the 
rules, which stem from their perception of and satisfaction with the process (Morgan, 1995). As 
in fisheries, it is probable that lobbying to increase the TAC or effort to increase one’s 
apportioned rights of the TAC will ensue (Grafton et al., 2005). Accordingly, the appropriation 
of shares should be wholly considered prior to forming a conservation market for whales because 
of the unique issues that arise as a result of lifting the moratorium and permitting access by 
conservationists. In deliberation, good decisions will equally weigh social (i.e. allowing users to 
actualize the value they place in a resource) and ecological objectives (i.e. ensuring a sustainable 
population and ecosystem). Economics of fisheries drives human behavior to a greater extent 
than can be expected for markets in big game and whale management where the aims have 
shifted to a focus on entertainment and non-consumptive value rather than solely extraction.  
 
Resource System and Resource Units. Location, spatial and temporal distribution, and 
resource unit mobility affect the ease of assessing ecological parameters of the resource system 
and monitoring user behavior. White rhinos fall within one jurisdiction, Bighorn sheep as an 
entire resource system span multiple but herds remain within localized areas, and Bluefin tuna 
occupy multiple jurisdictions as well as international waters. Unlike sovereign nations with the 
power to assign property rights, no authority exists to do this for international public goods 
(Perrings, 2014). Access rights hold resource users accountable to the consequences of their 
actions, an essential ingredient for viable markets. In addition, system dynamics need to be 
sufficiently predictable that users can estimate what would happen if they were to establish 
particular harvesting rules or no entry territories (Ostrom, 2009). 
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Agreements among nations may function well if animals occupy only national jurisdiction. Since 
property rights are unreasonable in some settings, wildlife that crosses borders requires other 
conservation techniques. Rather than policing an entire species’ range, efforts can be 
concentrated in sensitive areas where animals reside during critical life stages. Take, for 
example, the olive-sided flycatcher (Contopus cooperi), Wood thrush (Hylocichla mustelina), 
and Golden-winged warbler are among the over 300 species of Neotropical birds that winter in 
tropical rainforests and mangroves of Central and South America and spend the summer months 
in North America. Habitat loss and fragmentation are their greatest threat, though poaching that 
supplies the exotic pet trade and demand for plumage is also a real concern (NPS, 2010). Perhaps 
the best strategy is to safeguard the summer grounds where these animals nest and forage.  
 
The same paradigm may apply to Bluefin tuna if managers focus on protecting critical spawning 
grounds. Concentrated efforts on lowering mortality rates of young and reproductive-age adults 
can help restore populations. Similarly, African elephants (Loxodonta) move across continents 
and are important shapers of ecosystems, creating edge habitat, controlling vegetation, and 
fostering biodiversity. Their historically expansive migrations are now limited by enclosed parks, 
ranches, and human development, necessitating diverse, multi-scale regulatory regimes to match 
the multi-faceted problem. HMS, like bighorn sheep, whales (e.g., Humpbacks (Megaptera 
novaeangliae), which undertake longest migrations of any mammal), and Bluefin tuna, would 





Proposals for a ‘new’ type of conservation (Kareiva and Marvier, 2012) are ushering in novel 
ideas for how to balance the needs of people and nature. Wildlife markets are a potential course 
of action to broker a deal among stakeholders in a charged climate, like natural resource 
management, and to protect inherently and economically valuable species from demise (Mills, 
2012; Perrings, 2014). Ecological degradation and species loss are more probable in the absence 
of markets to convey signals of their value and to encourage positive long-term stewardship 
(Fujita, 2013). The rapid diversification of markets over the last 30 years makes a compelling 
case for the relevance of such solutions in wildlife conservation discussions. The motivation to 
pursue this path is based on economic theory that validates its likelihood of success judged 
against conservation benchmarks (Gerber et al., 2014
A,B
) and the experience of existing markets 
for megafauna worldwide that justify the role of property rights in saving jeopardized species. 
Presently, wading through the thick of these decisions is deficient and would benefit from the 
SES framework presented here for assessing markets for specific species and settings. 
 
The qualitative analysis I conducted is limited to describing rather than quantifying the 
relationships between the SES core subsystem variables to identify weak links in the case 
examples of wildlife markets. To expand this institutional perspective, complimentary 
approaches may be taken that would allow me to disentangle remaining ambiguity in the cases. 
Such approaches to test the weak links I identified could entail using differential equations, 
agent-based modeling, or bioeconomic modeling to tackle questions about various aspects of 
wildlife conservation markets, such as outcomes yielded by exploring different scenarios of 
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governance and enforcement. Drawing on a more comprehensive set of literature would allow 
the evaluation started here to have even more utility in conservation policy circles. 
 
Marine resources are a critical asset to commercial and subsistence interests worldwide for 
nutrition and income; yet, they are inadequately managed relative to their demand and 
importance. The problem of overexploitation arises from constraints inherent to marine resources 
and aspects of marine megafauna biology (e.g., low reproductive rates, long-ranging migrations, 
unique histories and relationships with humans that evoke strong preferences) (Hirata, 2004; 
Roman et al., 2013). Most notably, there is no authorized jurisdiction of the open ocean and there 
is limited available knowledge on marine wildlife. The latter should not preclude moving 
decisions forward, though it does retard the process. In addition, high stakeholder heterogeneity 
can promote comprehensive and diverse planning, but in this instance, abject differences may be 
prolonging the policy standstill. Because of these factors, solutions to successfully govern 
cetaceans and other highly migratory marine species have generally evaded policy makers. Any 
robust institutional arrangement must acknowledge the limitations of governing marine resources 
and complement the highly variable attributes of the global community. 
 
Conservation wildlife markets can be successful in any jurisdiction provided cultural and ethical 
sensitivity, adequate monitoring and sanctioning, and thorough knowledge of the resource and 
resource system. Mired by controversy, global whale management has much progress to make by 
way of improved policy decisions that replace the currently tenuous moratorium on commercial 
whaling. Considering the costs and benefits of rights-based management on the high seas, a 
market for whales does not appear advisable. Reports of recovering whales stocks over recent 
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decades are encouraging, and if demand for whale meat is both isolated and declining naturally, 
the spur for a market for harvest rights may be inappropriate unless IWC members vote to 
reestablish commercial whaling. A market for whales raises a host of ethical and socio-economic 
questions that are not worth stoking if the gains a whale market may reap are inferior to the costs 
of enforcing conservation. Markets as a tool have merit but are limited by the ecological, social, 
and economic conditions under which they operate. Given this, wildlife can be better managed 
using several strategies wedded with a market approach, at least temporarily, to better capture all 
values of the resource. 
 
No-take zones coupled with quota-based systems where whaling persists is worth continuing, 
seeing as it echoes the majority of both preservationist and harvest-minded stakeholders. 
Wildlife conservation markets should be explored more in-depth for alternative marine 
megafauna because of the multiple stressors from which they suffer and the opportunity to ally 
with existing fisheries that enlist catch share programs. International partners, like CITES, 
should be prompted for collaboration alongside fisheries managers and the IWC in order to 
improve rates of abidance to the rules. Questions that should be bookmarked for whale 
management are: Why do whaling nations (i.e. Iceland, Norway) opt out of international 
collaboration, and why does Japan continue to nurse a dated industry? More generally, empirical 
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